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In an era of increasing capital mobility and globalisation, the growing integration of financial 
markets seems to be a key factor of corporate governance convergence. One of the most striking 
differences between corporate governance systems of different countries is the dissimilarity in 
the firms’ ownership and control that exists across countries. According to the degree of 
ownership and control, corporate governance systems can be distinguished in outsider systems 
(characterised by wide dispersed ownership) and insider systems (characterised by concentrated 
ownership). The transition from a governance approach founded on the shareholder view and 
oriented to the optimization of economic performance to a policy founded on the stakeholder 
view and oriented to the appreciation of the interdependence among economic, social and 
environmental responsibility, seems to be a factor of de facto convergence between outsider and 
insider systems of corporate governance. The main finding of this chapter is that the effective 
integration of CSR, sustainability and leadership makes easier the convergence between insider 
and outsider corporate governance systems. Leadership starts at board level. Corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) and sustainability require good corporate governance, grounded on 
stakeholder engagement, fairness, transparency and accountability. All these principles are related 
with more externally focused boards and determine a governance approach directed to the growth 
of sustainable value. In light of the above, this chapter will consider how the social responsibility 
and the role of the leaders (CEOs, Board of Directors, managers, etc.) can determine a governance 
approach directed to the growth of sustainable value over time. This is possible through the 
exploitation of opportunities and the economic and social risk management with which the 
companies should compete. The achievement of sustainability leadership requires significant 
changes in the operational guidelines and critical factors for company’s success and it imposes 
the improvement of the internal control systems intended to provide essential support for 
responsible governance. Therefore, leadership aiming at sustainability (regardless of the corporate 
governance system) requires CSR to be transferred from top management to the entire 
organisation, increasing the ability to manage complexity with respect to articulated goals. So, the 
corporate social responsibility, if properly realized, tends to be a factor of substantial convergence 
between the different existing systems of corporate governance. 
 
Keywords: Sustainability; Leadership; Convergence; Corporate Governance; Insider and Outsider Systems; 
Corporate Social Responsibility; Internal Control Systems 
 
Although the chapter is the result of a team effort, Daniela M. Salvioni can be considered the author of 
Sessions 1, 2 and 6, Simona Franzoni the author of Session 4, Francesca Gennari the author of Sessions 





Sustainability leadership emphasizes the change that 
companies which want to be leaders in sustainability 
must deal with, accentuating the central role of 
corporate governance bodies as promoter and 
guarantor of the change’s effectiveness. 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) and 
sustainability require good corporate governance, 
grounded on stakeholder engagement, fairness, 
transparency and accountability. All these principles 
are related with more externally focused boards and 
determine a governance approach directed to the 
growth of sustainable value over time. This focus of 
boards worldwide has increasingly shifted to 
excellence every corporate governance systems. 
Sustainability leadership must penetrate the 
entire organization, but the first impulse of it derives 
from the Board of Directors. Therefore, the most 
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important actors in the process of achievement of 
sustainability leadership are the board’s members.  
Leadership starts at board level. First of all, the 
executive members of the board must recognize the 
principles of sustainability share these principles 
with non-executive members and transfer them in the 
long-term direction of the organisation. In fact ‘A 
leader is one or more people who […] focuses the 
follower(s) to the organization’s mission and 
objectives […] in a concerted coordinated effort to 
achieve the organizational mission and objectives’ 
(Winston and Patterson, 2006). 
Board’s members must recognize the 
importance of the transition from a strategic 
approach oriented to the optimization of economic 
performance favouring shareholders to a policy 
oriented to the appreciation of the interdependence 
among economic, social and environmental 
responsibility satisfying stakeholders’ expectations.  
Cadbury (1993) states that “ [...] It is the ability 
of boards of directors to combine leadership with 
control and effectiveness with accountability that will 
primarily determine how well [...] companies meet 
society's expectations of them”. The transition from 
shareholder view to stakeholder view requests new 
managerial skills, because of the change in significant 
variables to meet society’s expectations, but at the 
same time it seems promoting a substantial 
convergence about objectives, processes, cultures, 
competencies and behaviours among the different 
corporate governance systems existing worldwide. 
Considering corporate governance as means to 
favour and lead company’s performance, this chapter 
deems the assertion of CSR and sustainability can 
represent a significant factor of substantial 
convergence among corporate governance systems 
characterizing different countries. In particular our 
study underlines how policies oriented to CSR 
principles imply overcoming some divergence in key 
performance indicators characterizing insider and 
outsider corporate governance systems in the past.  
One of the most striking differences between 
countries’ corporate governance systems is the 
difference in the ownership and control of firms 
existing across countries (OECD, 1999). According to 
the degree of ownership and control, corporate 
governance systems can be divided into outsider 
systems (characterised by wide dispersed ownership) 
and insider systems (characterised by concentrated 
ownership).  
Markets’ and information’s globalization 
induced the search of convergence between corporate 
governance systems, in particular referring to listed 
companies. This convergence has been promoted by 
normative and self-discipline interventions focused 
on the spread of international best practices about 
corporate governance. Substantial processes of 
convergence seem to be necessary to complete 
processes of formal convergence. The main finding of 
this chapter is that the effective integration of CSR, 
sustainability and leadership promote the active 
convergence between insider and outsider corporate 
governance systems.  
In fact, fair settlement of stakeholders’ 
expectations and prevailing objectives about creation 
of sustainable value tend to determine the 
overcoming of pre-existing diversities in temporal 
orientation of financial goals. In particular, the 
assertion of a strategic orientation based on binomial 
economic dimension-sociability emphasises the link 
among company’s success, multidimensional 
significant variables and maximization of economic 
results in medium and long-term. 
In light of the above, the chapter is structured as 
follows. The second section outlines the change in 
corporate governance systems related to CSR and 
sustainability leadership and it provides a framework 
for understanding the role of key stakeholder in this 
change.  
The third section describes the interrelation 
between corporate governance and corporate social 
responsibility, emphasizing characteristics that 
corporate governance bodies should have to 
effectively assuming the role of change promoter 
towards sustainability leadership.  
The fourth section explains the relations among 
leadership, internal control systems and corporate 
performance, for the effective implementation of 
sustainable leadership. The achievement of 
leadership sustainability requires significant changes 
in the strategic and operational guidelines, 
broadening critical success factors deemed relevant 
and imposing the refinement of the internal control 
systems intended to provide essential support for 
obtaining conscious governance and achieving 
corporate performance (economic and socio-
environmental). 
The fifth section summarises the role of CSR as 
a factor of convergence between outsider and insider 
corporate governance systems.  
The last section of the chapter contains our final 
considerations on the relationship among 
globalization, corporate governance effectiveness 
and the leading role of CSR as a factor of convergence 
between outsider and insider systems of corporate 
governance. 
 
2. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND 
SUSTAINABILITY LEADERSHIP: THE ROLE OF KEY 
STAKEHOLDERS 
 
For a long time, orientation towards shareholders and 
profit maximization (Berle and Means, 1932; 
Friedman, 1962; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) have 
dominated the most of companies in industrialized 
countries. This behaviour was particularly 
emphasized in Anglo-Saxon big corporations, 
characterized by a high openness towards risk 
capitals market, clear separation between ownership 
and management, one-tier corporate governance 
systems and control functions exercised by markets 
(outsider or market-oriented systems).  
For listed companies, a leadership focused on 
economic responsibility in favour of shareholders 
implies differences between outsider and insider 
corporate governance systems. This with reference to 
the diverse concentration in ownership and the 
connected diverse degree of separation between 
ownership and control prevailing in each one of the 
two systems.  
In the outsider systems, the common high 
dispersion of share capital tends to associate the 
corporate success with a leadership oriented to the 
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profit’s maximization, with particular attention to the 
short-term, with the aim to obtain positive judgments 
by the market concerning the actions of boards 
characterized by a high independence. In this context, 
shareholders are asked to appreciate, usually once a 
year, the governance effectiveness referring to their 
expectations about short-term remuneration and 
their approval conditions the board members’ 
appointment and the shares’ market value. So, “the 
focus in this type of a system can be excessively 
short-term, reducing overall investment to a level 
lower that is considered efficient” (OECD, 1999). 
In the insider systems, instead, the high capital’s 
concentration among majority shareholders causes 
their frequent engagement in management, often as 
executives, and determines governance oriented to 
the maximization of the value creation in the long-
term. In this situation, leadership practiced by the 
board is strongly influenced by the majority 
shareholder’s behaviour, because its lasting 
participation in ownership tends to reflect in the 
maximization of economic performance over time. 
Hence, the triumph of shareholder view 
emphasises the dominance of economic 
responsibility to satisfy financial expectations of 
shareholders. However, the different characteristics 
of ownership structure (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell 
and Servaes, 1990) and the diverse ownership 
engagement in the board leadership structure 
(Maassen, 2002; Leblanc, 2004; Solomon, 2007) that 
characterize outsider and insider systems tend to 
determine factors of substantial divergence for 
companies working in the two systems. In particular, 
divergences in business strategy tendency are 
observed, with consequent differences in key 
performance indicators with reference to time 
orientation. 
The latest arise of new concepts referring to 
sustainable development and stakeholder relation 
management (Steurer, Langer, Konrad and 
Martinuzzi, 2005; Cadbury, 2006; Elkington, 2006) 
redefines the role of companies in society. In fact, a 
wide vision of responsibility based on appreciation of 
links between long-lasting company’s success and 
fair settlement of stakeholders’ expectations is 
established, with consequent changes in terms of 
spirit of governance.  
The acceptance of CSR and sustainability as 
important business performance indicators does not 
mean that the creation of value and the adequate 
shareholders’ remuneration are less important. Vice 
versa, the interdependence among stakeholder 
relation management, economic and socio-
environmental responsibility, results (economic and 
not economic ones), capability to obtain consents and 
resources should be opportunely emphasized. In fact, 
the capability to create fiduciary relations with all 
stakeholders increases the potentialities of value 
creation for shareholders over time, by means of 
opportunities’ exploitation and economic, social and 
environmental risk management (Esty and Winston, 
2008; Salvioni and Astori, 2013). 
The assumption of a leadership directed to the 
effective participation in a more resources-efficient, 
environment-oriented and competitive economy 
involves relevant changes in the complexity of 
relationships with significant stakeholders 
(shareholders, employees, investors, suppliers, 
customers, competitors, public administration, 
community and environment). At the same time, 
knowledge and Information Technology underline the 
potential growth of diffusion in information and 
comparative analysis by stakeholders.  
The successful companies are working towards 
the adoption, maintenance and reinforcement of 
governance systems that are coherent with 
international best practices standards and capable to 
manage the complexity of business and significant 
conditions for sustainable development. In this sense, 
the effectiveness of governance is greatly influenced 
by policies that emphasize the principles of global 
responsibility, positive and fair interaction with 
stakeholders, as well as respect of the environment.  
The growing importance of a governance 
oriented to global responsibility and stakeholder 
relation management leads to a greater attention for 
principles and values that dominate external and 
internal relations and to innovation of processes that 
guarantee a systematic, coordinated, effective and 
efficient orientation in the entire organization. In this 
context, the engagement of significant stakeholders 
is crucial for the definition of strategies and goals 
that create the conditions for lasting success. 
Board’s members have the task of planning the 
change toward sustainability according to a global 
strategy and priority objectives, promoting the 
spreading of a sustainability culture in the 
organization and its operational mechanisms so as to 
guarantee the effective achievement of sustainability. 
The assumption of sustainability leadership 
assumes the appreciation of stakeholder view 
(Freeman, 1984; Evan and Freeman, 1988; Donaldson 
and Preston, 1995; Friedman and Miles, 2002; 
Freeman, Martin and Parmar, 2007; Miles, 2012), the 
selection of significant stakeholders (key 
stakeholders) and the development of paths focused 
on stakeholders engagement and approval of their 
expectations; the rational and fair transfer of 
expectations in strategies; the transfer of leaders’ 
tendencies in management behaviours; the 
assessment of coherence among purposes, goals and 
results towards the optimization of performances 
and inter-companies relations. 
In fact, stakeholders' engagement is a necessary 
condition for the achievement and sharing of values 
which are significant for responsible and sustainable 
governance. In this context, the sustainability 
leadership creates the prerequisites for behaviours’ 
coordination and standardization and this is an asset 
determining company’s success. In particular, the 
internalization of values and principles shared by 
leaders and organization simplifies the correct 
realization of governance processes, it promotes the 
adoption of an effective and efficient management 
approach, and it facilitates the creation of positive 
relations between company and stakeholders and the 
risk reduction (Salvioni, 2010; Salvioni, Astori and 
Cassano, 2014). 
The acceptance of CSR and sustainability as 
important business performance indicators assumes 
a board leadership capable to manage the complexity 
along the ‘Triple Bottom Line’. This situation requests 
significant changes in management and, at the same 
time, it promotes the substantial convergence 
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between insider and outsider systems with regard to 
goals in terms of creation of sustainable value 
(Salvioni and Gennari, 2014).  
These changes primarily regard the following: 
- The appreciation of a governance vision which 
is socially responsible, based on effective 
stakeholders engagement processes. This vision must 
be focused on the integration between leadership and 
organizational decisions and corporate governance 
and internal control systems which are able to 
promote the potential creation of sustainable value; 
- the development of control systems that are 
fully closed to goals’ evolution and that enable risks 
monitoring with regard to different dimensions of 
responsibility; 
- The change in the variables to be monitored, 
with a greater appreciation of sustainability culture 
and critical factors for the optimization of relations 
with stakeholders. 
The previous considerations emphasize the 
important role of corporate governance bodies for the 
effective integration among CSR, sustainability and 
leadership. This integration assumes the promotion 
of active behaviours and manners to engage all key 
stakeholders. At the same time the emphasis on CSR 
principles requires a significant change in the long-
term direction of the organisation to fairly meet 
society’s expectations. 
Stakeholders’ expectations are economic and 
socio-environmental ones. Hence, leaders who adopt 
socially responsible behaviours must develop abilities 
to combine the expectations of wide categories of 
stakeholders in the best way and to satisfy these 
expectations by means of decisions and actions. The 
appreciation of cross-relationship between economic 
and socio-environmental efficacy and efficiency is 
essential to minimize the risks and to obtain 
company’s success in the long-term. 
Companies inspired by CSR tend to the creation 
of sustainable value, as a guarantee for their lasting 
vitality. This situation induces reconsideration in 
terms of governance orientation, interaction between 
boards and organization, key variables for the 
performance optimization. In this sense, pressure 
towards a substantial convergence between outsider 
and insider corporate governance systems can be 
observed. 
3. INTERRELATION BETWEEN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
Since the 1960s the relation between corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility has 
been given great attention (Jo and Harjoto, 2012).  
According to the European Commission, the CSR 
is defined as ‘the responsibility of enterprises for 
their impacts on society. [...] To fully meet their 
corporate social responsibility, enterprises should 
have in place a process to integrate social, 
environmental, ethical, human rights and consumer 
concerns into their business operations and core 
strategy in close collaboration with their 
stakeholders, with the aim of: maximising the 
creation of shared value for their 
owners/shareholders and for their other 
stakeholders and society at large; identifying, 
preventing and mitigating their possible adverse 
impacts’(EU COM(2011) 681 final).  
This definition asserts the assumption of a 
concept of global responsibility that is referred to all 
governance dimensions on one hand and on the other 
hand, the engagement of wide stakeholders’ 
categories is considered a critical factor for the 
competitive advantage and risk minimization. In fact, 
the emphasis on interdependence among different 
stakeholders’ requirements gives value to company’s 
capability to better anticipate changing opportunities, 
to reduce risks and to take advantage of these 
capabilities for the long-term success. In this 
situation the capability of the board of director to 
identify factors of company’s success which are 
linked to the expectations and satisfaction of wide 
stakeholders’ groups is critical. 
Therefore, corporate sustainability is closely 
related to the concepts of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) (Carroll 1999; Dahlsrud 2008; 
European Commission 2011): sustainability does not 
mean sacrificing shareholders’ interests to the benefit 
of other stakeholders, but it implies the adoption of 
a management orientation that is able to increase the 
potentiality of value creation in the long-term, 
balancing shareholder value creation with 
stakeholder value protection (Law, 2011). In fact, 
companies should safeguard the interests of all who 
contribute to the general value creation (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1998); this contribution represents the 
specific investment that a stakeholder decides to 
make and gives a legitimate or moral right to part of 
the value created (Blair, 1995). 
Effective stakeholder engagement processes are 
based on commitment of corporate governance 
bodies and on integration between decisions of 
leaders and day-to-day activities, with the aim to 
promote a real CSR culture. In this context, codes of 
conduct and codes of ethics represent practical CSR 
tools to spread the shared values of social 
responsibility, inspired by the respect and the 
protection of the interest of all stakeholders whom 
the company interacts with, at all organizational 
levels. The link between CSR values and management 
processes is very strong and emphasizes the 
importance of the alignment among board’s 
strategies, organization’s values and everyday 
practices (Painter-Morland, 2006). Board members 
should be aware that they cannot sit down at their 
desk and draft an ideal framework for the creation of 
corporate culture. The last, in fact, originates by 
shared values that become stronger over time 
because of the coherence between what the company 
says and what it does.  
Several studies investigate the possible links 
between corporate governance structure and CSR 
performance: evidence suggests that simultaneous 
improvement of each dimension of performance does 
not depend on a possible improvement in the board's 
composition and that which really matters is that the 
board shares in a substantial way the sustainability 
principles (Ricart et al., 2005; Ayuso and Argandona, 
2007; Spitzeck, 2009; Jo and Harjoto, 2015). 
So, the focal point of criticism on CSR is the 
boards of directors, as this key group defines and 
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implements corporate strategy and serves to 
safeguard the interests of key stakeholders (Mason 
and Simmons, 2014). In fact, board members first 
identify relevant stakeholders and must then balance 
stakeholders’ interests, by means of the strategies 
that include stakeholders’ expectations (Wang and 
Dewhirst, 1992; OECD, 2004; Kakabadse and 
Kakabadse, 2007).  
International interventions of OECD, ICGN, GRI 
and UN Global Compact go to this direction. 
Furthermore, at a national level, self-discipline codes 
often mention the importance of board’s 
independence and stakeholders' engagement. 
Direct stakeholders’ participation in decision-
making processes, their being present in the board, is 
one of the most effective ways of engaging the 
stakeholders. This choice can become an important 
element of the firm’s CSR strategy (Ayuso and 
Argandona, 2007). 
Some corporate governance systems provide for 
the institutionalized stakeholders’ presence in the 
board as a formal mechanism to express their 
significance for the company (Mitchell and Agle, 
1997). Co-determination consists in the attribution of 
participation right in corporate governance to 
employees, by means of their representatives in 
administrative and control organs. This institution 
characterizes some insider systems (Germany, 
Austria, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, 
Sweden, Norway, and Finland) with peculiarities 
depending on socio-economic contexts. In other 
countries, such as France, the exercise of 
representation right in corporate governance organs 
is normally at the company's discretion, but it 
becomes mandatory in some firm typologies (state 
ownership and privatised companies). In some other 
countries, such as Japan, the governance system is 
centred on work and, even if mandatory rules do not 
exist, employees and board of directors collaborate 
due to their cultural background.  
Therefore, mandatory rules can be a stimulus 
for the appreciation of CSR by companies and can 
also be a factor of crossing traditional difference 
between corporate governance systems, in particular 
with reference to possible conflicts of interests 
among different stakeholders. 
However, these compulsory interventions are 
focused only on some stakeholders groups and the 
adoption of behaviours formally compliant with rules 
is not enough to ensure sharing and inclusion of CSR 
principles into corporate culture. Vice versa, the value 
of compliance should be embedded in the corporate 
culture, as a shared principle that guides the 
behaviour of the entire organisation and constitutes 
the basis for managing any type of risks connected to 
global corporate responsibility.  
CSR leadership modifies the variables related to 
decision-making process. In fact, the interdependence 
among economic, social and environmental 
responsibilities is emphasised with the aim to fairly 
optimize all stakeholders’ interests. In this sense, the 
commitment of corporate governance organs in CSR 
matters favours the implementation of CSR practice 
in the organization’s core strategy and it is crucial for 
the creation of a sustainability culture that goes 
beyond the mandatory rules and creates the 
prerequisites for positive relationships with all 
relevant stakeholders. So, board’s leaders who are 
oriented to sustainability tend to co-ordinate and 
foster relationships with both internal and external 
stakeholders (Maak and Pless, 2006), with the aim to 
guarantee the creation of value in the long-run and 
the consequent company’s success. Leaders inspired 
by CSR principles should be as architects who nurture 
and grow relationships with the stakeholder through 
continuous dialogue about the organization’s 
strategic objectives and governance issues (Maritz et 
al., 2011). 
Therefore, the effectiveness of CSR requires the 
sharing of values by leaders and organisation, a 
leadership based on continuous comparison with 
complex and multi-dimensional realities, and a 
leadership approach going beyond the traditional 
managerial talent. In particular, a managerial 
approach should be adopted that devotes great 
attention to the principles and values that govern 
internal and external relations, fosters the innovation 
of processes for the spreading a coordinated, 
effective and efficient orientation toward 
sustainability. 
 
4. LEADERSHIP, INTERNAL CONTROL SYSTEMS 
AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE  
 
Sustainable leadership derives from responsible 
decisions that have been perfected at a corporate 
governance body level but that should permeate the 
entire organisation. The behaviour of all internal 
stakeholders within the corporate system (corporate 
governance bodies and members of the 
organisations) should be co-ordinately targeted at the 
creation of sustainable value. 
The board of directors, executive directors, 
managers and employees/staff are required to 
operate continuously in accordance with 
effectiveness and efficiency, taking an active part in 
the formulation of decisions (strategic and 
operational) and in their implementation, to maintain 
a balance between all the interests that converge in 
the company. In this context, the presence of 
sustainable leadership-oriented staff and their 
motivation are essential to the creation and 
development of design and operational teams capable 
of dealing collectively with the challenge of corporate 
success. A participatory leadership style tends to 
encourage the sharing and interiorization of goals 
(Schein, 2010), with ample opportunity for the 
adoption of behaviour-based integration between 
economic and socio-environmental performance. 
The achievement of leadership sustainability 
requires significant changes in the operational 
guidelines, broadening critical success factors 
deemed relevant and imposing the refinement of the 
internal control systems intended to provide essential 
support for obtaining conscious governance. 
Leadership aiming at sustainability, therefore, 
requires CSR to be transferred from the corporate 
governance bodies to the entire organisation, 
increasing the ability to handle complexity with 
respect to the goals to pursue and to prevent and 
pilot the large series of business risks, particularly 
those related to environment, safety and future 
sustainability.  
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In this regard, it seems appropriate to point out 
that integration of responsibilities along the triple 
bottom line, supported by appropriate control 
systems to foster sustainable culture throughout the 
organisation, tends to allow for more effective risk 
management and to increase the ability to limit the 
negative effects of the same. 
The need to identify and manage critical 
elements underlines the importance of focussing on 
the development of an internal control system that 
enables to monitor the risks and the dissemination of 
a positive approach to reporting and the direction of 
the same within the organisation. 
Internal control systems that are designed to 
take advantage of opportunities, promptly signalling 
the uncertainty of the defined phenomena, acting and 
reacting to threats, ensuring a coordinated and 
systematic approach to risk, all ensure that one can 
maintain one's own competitive advantage in an 
increasingly open, dynamic and uncertain 
environment. Therefore, the structural and 
operational characteristics of control processes must 
ensure the continuous monitoring of the factors that 
are critical for company success and the proper 
recognition of the relevant variables for their 
management, in compliance with the optimisation of 
economic and social-environmental performance. 
The corporate governance body defines the 
guidelines of internal control in line with the 
company’s needs, with existing regulatory constraints 
and with internal and external complexity, in order to 
achieve an appropriate distribution of responsibilities 
in all managerial behaviours. Internal control is then 
delegated to specific dedicated bodies (internal 
control systems manager, internal auditor, risk 
manager, controller, compliance officer, etc.) but 
envisages the involvement of the operational 
management and of the entire organisation, the 
behaviour of which determines the timing and means 
to achieve the objectives. 
Therefore, the integrated internal control 
processes can be summarised as being aimed at 
checking the validity of the adopted procedures; the 
behavioural transparency and harmony between 
indications of responsibility and operational 
processes (internal auditing); the risk management of 
the company (risk management) and its compliance 
with rules, regulations, procedures and internal codes 
(compliance control and supervisory); and at 
orienting organization towards the realization of 
strategic select policies in a coordinated way, to 
responsibly meet the expectations of stakeholders 
(management control) (Salvioni, 2010). This concerns 
direct mechanisms aimed at fostering the transfer of 
corporate governance bodies' strategies into 
operational behaviours, to ensure the continued 
achievement of the conditions enabling achievement 
of long-lasting business success, through the 
effective management and monitoring of critical 
elements. 
The assertion of a sustainable leadership 
broadens the traditional framework for the planning 
of internal control activities. Business success is no 
longer only based on economic performance criteria, 
but is connected to the optimisation of environmental 
and social performance (Székely and Knirisch, 2005). 
Sustainable companies, therefore, determine their 
own strategy with reference to the three 
aforementioned dimensions of performance, 
according to the logic of global responsibility and 
consequently, the objectives are divided into 
medium- to long- and short-term, and processes are 
aimed at ensuring effective and efficient 
implementation. 
The critical factors in business success, 
therefore, register significant changes, with the 
progressive acknowledgement of the critical role of 
specific intangible components (Franzoni, 2013) 
associated with the proper exercising of 
responsibility at all levels. Consequently, internal 
control systems should be re-designed on the basis of 
any subsequent changes made in relevant variables 
and the spreading of a culture of sustainability takes 
primary importance.  
Indeed, the sustainable growth of the company 
depends on its ability to identify the significant 
variables that may affect the successful integrated 
management of corporate responsibility and to 
intervene seeking to govern the critical factors that 
determine success. 
Direct interventions to implement governance 
geared towards sustainability, at first, involve an 
adequate appreciation of the intangible asset of the 
company. In order for a globally responsible 
behaviour to produce benefits, intangible resources 
should be adequately directed and controlled so as to 
create value and help in the transfer of top 
management strategies into organisational 
behaviour, and this in particular as regards 
organisational capital, human capital and relational 
capital. The following should be taken into 
consideration: 
 Organisational capital expresses the quality of a 
company, associated with variables such as 
corporate values, internal culture, policies and 
business strategies, organisational structure, 
business processes and information systems; 
 Human capital is the quality of the individuals in 
a company, due to a set of variables that influence 
behaviours and results, including the level of 
education of the employees, their skills and 
expertise, their qualifications and training; 
 Relational capital expresses the quality of 
relations connected directly to the involvement of 
stakeholders. In this regard, factors such as the 
following emerge as relevant: shared values and 
rules of conduct, the value of the brand and the 
reputation in the various markets of interaction. 
Achieving sustainable leadership therefore 
requires specific intangible components to grow as 
expected so as to lay the ground for effectiveness. In 
this event, the variables to be monitored should be re-
defined and the monitoring parameters and related 
information systems should be adapted. 
Therefore, control systems effectiveness is 
significantly grounded in the observation of 
dominant critical factors and is still primarily 
affected by the spread of the culture of sustainability 
at all levels of the organisation. Culture conditions all 
corporate behaviour, determining the conditions for 
internal sharing and the potential of obtaining 
consent. 
The existence of a strong sustainability culture 
which is shared by the corporate governance bodies 
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and the entire organisation is therefore a critical 
element for social interaction and optimisation of 
performance. Consequently, when designing a control 
system, the following actions cannot be omitted: 
analysis of the existing culture, assessment of the 
ability of the control activity to instil the conditions 
for corporate responsibility and to contribute to 
create values which are consistent throughout the 
entire organisation; verification of optimality of 
cultural growth processes activated by the company 
and their constant coherence with the guidelines set 
forth by corporate governance bodies. 
Sustainable leadership thus enhances managing 
variables that have long been neglected, but that are 
essential for the coordination of all organisational 
behaviour. These variables affect the design of 
effective internal control systems, guiding integration 
and determining the essential conditions for the 
transfer of corporate governance guidelines into the 
behaviour of the entire organisation.  
Failure to transfer the principles of 
sustainability into the various management tasks can 
disrupt the correct implementation of the decisions 
of corporate governance bodies, to the detriment of 
leadership effectiveness. An effective and coherent 
design of control systems ensures the proper 
dissemination of the principles of sustainability in all 
organisational behaviour, optimising the economic 
and socio-environmental performance. 
In summary, the presence of strong and shared 
values, the fair reconciliation of all expectations and 
protection of the environment are all aspects that 
facilitate the coordination between corporate 
governance bodies and the organisation as well as the 
effectiveness of the message sent. In this context, the 
conditions of fairness, transparency and the ability of 
leaders to involve the various stakeholders, on whom 
the development of the strategic plan pursued 
depends, are all of primary importance. Therefore, 
the adoption of sustainability-oriented governance 
requires the internal control systems to be re-
designed in relation to the changes in the complexity 
of the variables under observation, to ensure effective 
guidance of all behaviours towards the co-ordinated 
achievement of a performance aimed at improving 
the creation of sustainable value. 
 
5. CSR AS A FACTOR OF CONVERGENCE BETWEEN 
OUTSIDER AND INSIDER SYSTEMS 
 
Corporate approach towards the creation of 
sustainable value is a source of global competitive 
advantage, by means of the overtaking of traditional 
division between short-term profit and long-term 
value. Sustainability leadership, because of the 
combined consideration of economic and social 
dimensions, tends to align companies’ behaviours 
independently from financial markets’ 
characteristics, shareholders base composition 
(conditions differentiating insider and outsider 
systems) and relations between corporate governance 
bodies (conditions differentiating one-tier and two-
tier systems). 
According to several scholars, a gradual path of 
convergence in corporate governance systems is 
occurring (Carati and Tournai, 2000; Mallin, 2002; 
Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). The events of 
convergence between outsider and insider systems 
can be observed according to these dimensions (La 
Porta et al., 2000; Gilson, 2004; Khanna et al., 2006; 
Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009; Lazarides and 
Drimpetas, 2010): convergence in form or de jure and 
convergence in function or de facto. 
Convergence in form or de jure refers to 
convergence of rules at country level, whereas 
convergence in function or de facto refers to corporate 
behaviours. Both phenomena have accelerated 
because of changes in traditional competitive 
environment related to globalization that determined 
the redefinition of responsibility relations among 
subjects belonging to economic system.  
Referring to de jure convergence, national 
systems are encouraged to the production of rules 
inspired by high-quality corporate governance 
standards and principles (e.g. OECD Principles on 
Corporate Governance, UN Global Compact 
principles, UE Papers). In fact, these standards about 
good governance condition, on one hand, national 
legislations and, on the other hand, the governance 
practices voluntary adopted by companies to 
adequately compete on global markets. 
Interventions by international bodies focuses 
also on relations between CSR and corporate 
governance structure, sharing the idea that a systemic 
and not occasional approach on CSR requires a strong 
commitment by leaders. 
UN Global Compact Framework recommends the 
board’s commitment in the definition of sustainable 
strategies: the first condition to participate to Global 
Compact initiatives is the company’s commitment at 
higher levels and the company’s leadership is 
required to send a clear message that shifting 
towards sustainability is a strategic priority (UN 
Global Compact, 2014).  
Management engagement is considered crucial 
not only for strategies about sustainability to be 
realized in the framework global projects in the long-
term, but also for the creation and strengthening of 
corporate culture inspired to sustainable principles at 
all levels.  
‘[…] Consequently, businesses that integrate 
sustainability into their strategies and operations are 
increasingly finding themselves in positions of long-
term strength. Enhancing this understanding of the 
overlap between public and private interests is key to 
inspiring more companies to engage and take action.’ 
UN Global Compact (2013), Building The Post-2015 
Business Engagement Architecture. 
A research ordered by UN highlights that the 
majority of CEOs of companies adhering to Global 
Compact considers sustainability important to the 
future success of their business (93%), a route to 
competitive advantage in their industry (80%) and an 
opportunity for growth and innovation (78%) (UN 
Global Compact-Accenture CEO Study, 2013). The 
philosophy of sustainability is becoming a critical 
factor of success due to systemic risks management 
and capability to catch growth opportunities in a 
proactive way. 
‘Corporate sustainability is imperative for 
business today – essential to long-term corporate 
success and for ensuring that markets deliver value 
across society. To be sustainable, companies must do 
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five things: Foremost, they must operate responsibly in 
alignment with universal principles and take actions 
that support the society around them. Then, to push 
sustainability deep into the corporate DNA, companies 
must commit at the highest level, report annually on 
their efforts, and engage locally where they have a 
presence’. UN Global Compact, Guide to corporate 
sustainability, 2014. 
On February 2013 the European Parliament 
adopted a resolution in which the importance of a 
commitment by the board on CSR matters is stressed. 
The EU Parliament, in particular, reminds that 
corporate responsibility must not be reduced to a 
marketing tool and that the only way to fully develop 
CSR is to embed it in a company’s overall business 
strategy, implement it and translate it into reality in 
its day-to-day operations and financial strategy. The 
EU Commission should encourage companies to 
decide on a CSR strategy at board level 
(2012/2098(INI). 
Also national interventions can contribute to the 
diffusion of best practices favouring the intention to 
imitate phenomena at global level and, so, 
convergence in corporate governance systems. For 
example, India puts great emphasis on leaders' 
engagement in CSR matters. Companies Act (2013) 
imposes great companies to make a CSR Reporting 
and to create a CSR Committee composed at least of 
three directors (two for foreign companies). The CSR 
Committee is responsible for developing and 
recommending policies to the board CSR; 
encouraging the implementation of such policies; 
monitoring the CSR performance. 
De facto convergence can be observed referring 
to single firm’s behaviour, when the same corporate 
practices are exercised abstract from corporate 
governance systems’ characteristics. De facto 
convergence can stimulate de jure convergence; it 
happens, for example, in case of legislative void or 
gap and companies autonomously adopt existing best 
practices to deal with competitive pressure (Gilson, 
2001).  
Leadership oriented to sustainability at 
corporate governance bodies’ level is a factor of 
overtaking traditional limits of outsider systems and 
insider ones. The former are traditionally oriented to 
the maximization of short-term profit with the aim to 
obtain positive judgments by the market with regard 
to the actions of board’s members, which are 
characterized by a high level of independence. The 
latter, on the other hand, are oriented to the 
maximization of the value creation over time because 
of the high capital’s concentration and the frequent 
engagement in management by majority 
shareholders. The commitment of the board in CSR 
matters encourages a long-term approach in the value 
creation with impact on company’s objectives and 
strategies and, as a consequence, promoting the 
gradual promotion of a sustainability culture in all 
organizational levels.  
As an example, the analysis of 20 companies 
included in the Global 100 Index49 for at least 5 years 
                                                          
49 The Global 100 Index expresses the “Most Sustainable Corporations in the 
World” and it is managed by “Corporate Knights Capital”, which 
builds indexing solutions and market-beating portfolios for institutional clients. 
See www.corporateknights.com. 
50 As Strand states: ‘In some cases the Chief Sustainability Officer position was 
installed temporarily with the specific intent of raising sustainability 
confirms the convergence between insider and 
outsider systems related to corporate governance 
based on sustainability leadership (Table 1). 
Table 1 shows that, irrespective of corporate 
governance systems (insider or outsider one), 
companies that systematically include sustainability 
matters in their goals and strategies are characterized 
by: 
 long-term business orientation; this refers to the 
crossing of divergence in time orientation about 
economic results with the aim to permanently 
create value satisfying equally ample stakeholder 
groups. The long-term perspective means that the 
ultimate goal of an organization is sustainability 
(Schaefer, 2004, Porter and Kramer, 2006; 
Mostovicz et al, 2009); 
 systematic commitment of the board in 
sustainability goals also by means of specific 
committees and chief officers50; 
 belief that a sustainability-oriented board is a 
change agent (Maritz et al., 2011) able to maintain 
a constant dialogue with stakeholders and to 
ensure the dynamic CSR matters are integrated 
into corporate objectives and business operations. 
The effective board’s commitment in CSR matters 
represents the prerequisite for the strategies 
realization in organizational levels and the 
consequent obtainment of coherent economic and 
socio-environmental performance. In this sense the 
leadership should be intended not only as a 
hierarchical position, but also as personal 
engagement of board’s members (Mostovicz et al., 
2009); in this sense the leadership of the board is 
based on the CSR values that the members represent. 
This situation guarantees the company’s success over 
time because the change in leaders’ orientation 
towards sustainability regards mission, vision, 
company’s goals and strategies necessarily involving 
the entire organization. Therefore, the translation of 
sustainability values into actual results requires 
coherent internal control’s tools and processes 
(Salvioni and Astori, 2013).  
These mechanisms, favouring the transfer of 
sustainability concepts in business behaviours at all 
organizational levels, promote substantial 
convergence in corporate governance.  
The recognition of sustainability principles as 
corporate cultural factors is differently fulfilled 
according to company’s characteristics and external 
ties. In fact, corporate governance systems are the 
result of cumulative processes (Djelic, 1998; Bebchuk 
and Roe, 1999; Vogel, 2003; Puchniak, 2007; Davies 
and Schiltzer, 2008): rules about corporate 
governance structure and processes depend on 
characteristics of context (financial markets, capital 
dispersion, importance of banks, etc.) and on the 
necessity to regulate companies’ behaviours (Bebchuk 
and Hamdani, 2009). Companies’ voluntary conducts 
can pre-empt formal best practices, inciting mutual 
phenomena of formal and substantial convergence 
towards the overcoming of traditional corporate 
governance systems’ limits.  
considerations and related issues on the corporation’s strategic agenda, 
meaning that the removal of the Top Management Team (TMT) position may 
well be an indicator of its success. In Storebrand, for instance, the TMT position 
of Executive Vice President (EVP), Corporate Responsibility, held for the 3 
years of its existence by Elin Myrmel-Johansen, was put into place in January 
2008 and removed in February 2011’ (Strand, 2014, p.702).  
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[...] want to be successful in the long run. We want to create as much value for all our stakeholders as 
possible. As you see, sustainability thinking at the Adidas Group is not treated in isolation but is part 
of the everyday practice of multiple corporate functions – integrated into the business model of the 
Adidas Group. Needless to say, there is room for further strengthening and integrating of sustainability 
performance measures into our overall performance management. 
The Social and Environmental Affairs (SEA) team is a diverse group of 65 people – engineers, lawyers, 
HR managers, environmental auditors and former members of non-governmental organizations. The 
team is organised into three regional teams […] , as well as the Group-wide functions of Environmental 
Services and Community Affairs. 
City 
Developments 
Sustainability [...] is imperative to our long-term viability. A company-wide CSR Committee is 
responsible for mapping out CSR strategies and measuring key performance. This Committee initiates, 
drives and monitors various aspects of the Company’s CSR practices to ensure these are integrated into 
our business operations and complement corporate objectives. Above this committee, at the Board Level, 
is a CSR & CG Committee that assumes an advisory role for the Company’s CSR strategies. The CSR & 
CG Committee is chaired by our Deputy Chairman with two independent Directors. 
H&M 
We take a long-term view on our business and investing in our sustainability means investing in our 
future. 
Our Head of Sustainability reports directly to our CEO and the responsibility for the implementation of 
our sustainability strategy is held by our executive management team. 
Kesko 
The Senior Vice President, Corporate Responsibility, Communications and Stakeholder Relations, a 




With our understanding of many of the longer-term challenges our world faces, we see major 
opportunities to apply our innovative competencies and create value for our stakeholders. 
Executive Vice President & Chief Strategy and Innovation Officer. Functions: Group responsibilities: 
Strategy, Innovation, Design, Sustainability, Accelerate! - Resource to win 
Natura 
Cosmesticos 
Sustainability runs through our entire governance model. The Sustainability Committee is an important 
preparatory discussion forum before decisions are made by Comex, and the issues are also regularly 
analyzed by the Board. It is overseen by the Sustainability Board, which monitors the execution of the 
action plans that are run by the various corporate departments. 
Neste Oil 
We create long-term business success. 
Sustainability work is steered by the Senior Vice President, Sustainability and Public Affairs, who is a 
member of the Neste Executive Board. The Board of Directors approves policies covering sustainability 
and monitors how Neste Oil performs in terms of sustainability. The Neste Executive Board is responsible 
for outlining the company’s strategic approach to sustainability and monitoring how sustainability is 
reflected in business units and support function operations. Matters related to sustainability are reviewed 
regularly by the Board of Directors, the Neste Executive Board, and the management teams of the 
Sustainability and HSEQ organization, business areas, and production plants. 
Novo Nordisk 
Novo Nordisk has chosen three long-term social targets to support long-term financial performance, 
balancing responsibility with profitability, with the aim of creating sustainable value for shareholders 
and other stakeholders 
The Board of Directors determines the company’s overall strategy and follows up on its implementation, 
supervises the performance, ensures adequate management and organisation, and as such actively 
contributes to developing the company as a focused, sustainable, global pharmaceutical company. 
Statoil 
[...] by creating long-term value for both our shareholders and the societies and economies in which we 
operate. 
The Safety, Sustainability and Ethics Committee will assist Statoil ASA’s (the Company’s) board of 
directors (the Board) in its supervision of the Company’s safety, security, sustainability and ethics 
policies, systems and principle 
Storebrand 
It is essential that we are able to take a long-term perspective. 
The Group’s corporate sustainability goals are adopted by the Board, and the sustainability scorecard is 
followed up by the Group's executive management team 
Vivendi 
Group’s overall performance over the medium and long term. 


















Sustainability is a prerequisite for long-term performance and value protection for our shareholders 
The Sustainability Committee of the Board provides direction and oversight of the implementation of 
the Group’s Licence to Operate strategy and provides strategic and operational leadership on HSSE 
matters 
Centrica 
[...] long-term sustainable value creation for all of Centrica’s stakeholders. 
The Board is responsible for: […] the Group’s corporate responsibility arrangements including health, 
safety and environmental matters; [...]. 
Enbridge 
[...]strengthening our company’s longer term future. 
The Corporate Social Responsibility Committee is responsible for reviewing, approving or 
recommending to the Board the risk guidelines, policies, procedures and practices relating to CSR matters 
Prologis 
Trust and business integrity are critical to the long-term health of company. 
The Board Governance and Nomination Committee regularly reviews and develops recommendations 
for the board regarding corporate governance matters and principles, as well as environmental 
stewardship and social responsibility matters. 
Sun Life 
Financial 
Our focus on sustainability reflects the long-term nature of commitments. 
Suncor Energy 
We are going to keep engaging with all of our stakeholders and listening to their concerns as we continue 
to develop and pursue long-term goals. 
Environmental, Health, Safety & Sustainable Development (EHS&SD) Committee 
Unilever 
[...] towards our longer-term goal of developing a sustainable business. 
Corporate Responsibility Committee reviews  and provides input to the Company on the management 
of current and emerging sustainability matters affecting the Company and provides external and 
independent oversight and guidance on the environmental and social impact of how Unilever conducts 
its business. 
Chief Sustainability Officer. 
Westpac Banking 
[...] to support more sustainable long-term outcomes. 
Responsibilities of the Board: […] considering the social, ethical and environmental impact of our 
activities and monitoring compliance with our sustainability policies and practices. 
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6. EMERGING ISSUES 
 
The spread of sustainability principles and a wide 
concept of responsibility foster, without doubt, a 
change in relevant corporate performances, 
modifying business orientation and creating 
prerequisites for substantial convergence in 
corporate governance systems.  
Sustainable leadership implies a progressive 
extension of corporate objectives. The traditional 
governance framework tends to be more complex 
because of the network of internal and external 
relations, according with an approach based on 
information exchange and behaviours optimization 
with regard to stakeholders’ expectations. 
Sustainability becomes a formal business driver. 
This induces to a review of governance tendencies 
and of interaction between corporate governance 
bodies and organization. Furthermore, a deep 
revision of critical variables for performance 
optimization must be considered. 
Assertion and sharing of values that are 
significant for responsible and sustainable 
governance are conditions for behaviours’ 
coordination and uniformity, which are important 
assets for the company’s success. In particular, the 
internalization of values and principles shared by 
leaders and organization favours the correct exercise 
of governance, promotes effective and efficient 
management approach, facilitates the creation of 
positive relations between company and stakeholders 
and favours risks control. 
Sustainable leadership goes with control 
structures and processes more and more articulated. 
In this context the diffusion of ethical values and 
principles is, at the same time, a factor to be 
monitored and a requisite for the management 
effectiveness and the maximization of sustainable 
value. 
Hence, irrespective of characteristics in capital 
markets and ownership concentration, companies 
which effectively integrate CSR, sustainability and 
leadership have modified their corporate policy 
giving importance to the creation of sustainable 
values as a condition for their growth and 
development in the long-term. One of the most 
important elements of divergence between insider 
and outsider corporate governance systems, related 
to the different time tendency to results, decreases. 
It is also necessary taking into consideration that 
globalization - characterized by progressive 
reduction of differences in space, cultures, 
information systems, customs and institutions – 
requests a greater uniformity in corporate 
governance approaches at global level.  
Furthermore, the downfall of barriers among 
markets and capital circulation, on one hand, 
increased investors’ choices and, on the other hand, 
highlighted that the creation of value in the long-term 
can represent an important element for investment 
risk reduction. 
Companies characterized by sustainable 
leadership can be more attractive for investors, 
increasing their opportunities in obtaining resources 
and growth of their capital value. About that, what 
Larry Fink, BlackRock’s Chairman and CEO, said in the 
Annual Letter to BlackRock’s Shareholders of 
16/04/2015 appears symbolic. He said: “This annual 
report highlights how the platform we’ve created over 
time translates into long-term value for clients and 
shareholders even in the face of global market 
upheaval. But it also gives us a chance to look toward 
the future. BlackRock has stayed ahead of the 
competition over time by thinking long term: building 
the technology, talent and investment solutions that 
our clients and shareholders can build on, and that will 
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